White supremacists use Rhodesia to contrast with autocratic Zimbabwe ruled by former resistance leader and Hitler admirer Robert Mugabe. This serves as warning against giving up power. It argues you wouldn t want Mugabe would you
But the argument for Rhodesia being a better alternative never held much water. Aside from the obvious one that the argument endorses a white supremacist government is that Mugabe was never destined to lead Zimbabwe.
It wasn t until the late 1970s that Mugabe took control of ZANU and its military wing ZANLA after the group s leader Herbert Chitepo died when assassins blew up his Volkswagen Beetle. ZANU had emerged as the strongest rebel faction after its competitor ZAPU launched a failed conventional offensive into Rhodesia from its bases in Mozambique in the late 1960s.
By this point the Rhodesian regime was on the defensive having fought a hopeless counter insurgency war for years. To cut off the civilian population from the rebels the regime had forcibly moved hundreds of thousands of blacks into protected villages behind barbed wire Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin recounted in The Rhodesian War A Military History.
Although militarily effective it was a propaganda gift to the insurgents Moorcraft and McLaughlin described. So were the no go areas and free fire zones along the Mozambique border. As the curfews were extended the inevitable increase in civilian deaths made guerrilla recruitment easier.
Rebel groups such as ZANU/ZANLA radicalized. Control of the party passed inexorably into the hands of the more radical party members and Mugabe emerged in 1978 as the clear and publicly acknowledged leader and as commander in chief of ZANLA the authors noted.
But had the government abandoned white rule in 1965 or sooner instead of 1979 and before Mugabe was well entrenched at the top of the ZANU hierarchy future Zimbabwe may never have had him as president. The country may have had a president Joshua Nkomo Edgar Tekere or Ndabaningi Sithole instead.
Another myth is that Rhodesia was a white nation with native Rhodesian whites fighting a communist invasion. In fact half the white population in the 1970s were settlers who immigrated after independence from Britain and many were willing to move elsewhere.
The Rhodesian regime considered this one of its biggest weaknesses and even took steps to halt white emigration such as restricting the amount of property and cash whites could transfer out of the country. And while China backed ZANU and the Soviet Union backed ZAPU the rebel groups own propaganda would never have been effective had elements of it not resonated with the country s black population.
As Moorcraft and McLaughlin described Rhodesian white elites never understood that. Racism blinded them and most importantly functioned as a self serving justification that blacks were incapable of governance and thus political organization. It was the responsibility for whites they believed to paternalistically rule a country that was 96 percent black.
The resistance groups thought very differently and set about organizing them. Obviously the whites were in for a rude shock.Another myth concerns the Rhodesian military s tactical prowess popularized in the West through mercenary recruiting ads in Soldier of Fortune magazine.
Military schools have studied Rhodesian light infantry tactics ever since. Modern bomb protected armored vehicles with sloped underbellies owe heavily to the Rhodesian army. But while at times tactically ingenious the Rhodesians found themselves fighting an enemy that refused to play the same game.
The rebels targeted the regime where it was weakest such as propaganda and economic warfare. One of the biggest rebel victories was a 1978 rocket attack on Rhodesia s strategic oil reserve. The rockets hit the fuel tanks in Salisbury today Harare wiping out the reserve in a single blow. Rhodesia capitulated a few months later.
Indeed the military performance of the guerrillas particularly in the early part of the war was appalling Moorcraft and McLaughlin noted. Both sides however learned from their mistakes. In the end the Rhodesians often met fierce resistance and came to repent their initial underestimation of the enemy.
Early rebel offensives failed resulting in heavy casualties for the militant groups and light casualties for the regime. These lulled the white ruled government into a sense of complacency and set the stage for its eventual defeat.
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